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The Struggle to Define Privacy Rights
and Liabilities in a Digital World and the
Unfortunate Role of Constitutional
Standing
JUAN OLANO*
Today’s world runs on data. The creation and improvement of technological products and services depend on the
exchange of data between people and companies. As people’s lives become more digitized, companies can collect,
store, and analyze more data, and in turn, create better technology. But, because consumer data can be very sensitive
(think Social Security numbers, GPS location, fingerprint
recognition, etc.) this cyclical exchange comes with serious
privacy risks; especially in light of more frequent and sophisticated cyberattacks. This creates a face-off between
technological growth and privacy rights. While it makes
sense that people should be willing to subside some of their
privacy in exchange for technological enhancements to
things like communication, health, and entertainment, companies should also be doing their best to prevent and respond to cyberattacks.
This Note highlights the urgency created by the combination of the digitization of consumer lives, sophisticated
hackers, and inadequate data privacy laws. It explains that,
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because Congress is yet to legislate and the Supreme Court’s
findings in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin created federal circuit splits, data privacy laws are either non-existent or muddled. As a result, it
is increasingly difficult for companies or consumers to know
their rights, responsibilities, and liabilities in this sphere.
Moreover, this Note calls for Congress to establish federal
compliance measures with respect to corporate use of consumer data and handling of cyberattacks. However, this
Note argues that Congress will continue to remain silent
and, therefore, the Supreme Court, by revisiting the constitutional standing issues presented in Clapper and Spokeo,
can be the one—for now—to provide much needed guidance
with respect to data privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
“If we’re going to be connected, then we need to be protected . . .
we shouldn’t have to forfeit our basic privacy when we go online to
do our business,” President Barack Obama stated in a 2015 National
Public Radio interview.1 He was calling for the federal government

Scott Horsley, Obama: ‘If We’re Going To Be Connected, Then We Need
To Be Protected,’ NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/01/12/376788871/obama-if-were-going-to-be-connected-then-we-need-to-be-protected.
1
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to help improve security systems to prevent cyberattacks.2 Ironically, and underscoring the urgency of Obama’s remarks, cybercriminals hacked the United States Central Command’s Twitter account later that day.3
The President’s declarations were well-grounded: in 2016 alone,
there were at least 980 reported4 data breaches through which more
than 35,233,317 records were exposed.5 Most recently, Equifax reported that a data breach hit 143 million user accounts.6 Juniper research predicted that data breaches will cost at least $2.1 trillion
globally by 2019.7
We are living in a vulnerable era where our personal and financial data is stored in everyday devices, gadgets, and appliances that
are susceptible to cyberattacks.8 The technological revolution has
spurred an unprecedented increase in companies’ collection of per-

2

Id.
Everett Rosenfeld, FBI Investigating Central Command Twitter Hack,
CNBC (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/12/us-central-commandtwitter-hacked.html.
4
Most breaches are not reported or even detected. Steve Morgan, Cyber
Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#7108068e3a91. “The World Economic Forum (WEF) says a significant portion of cybercrime goes undetected, particularly
industrial espionage where access to confidential documents and data is difficult
to spot.” Id.
5
This number only reflects reported breaches involving more than an email,
user name, and password, meaning that in actuality, there were probably many
more breaches. See Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, ITRC (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html.
6
See Matt Burgess, That Yahoo Data Breach Actually Hit Three Billion Accounts, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/hacks-databreaches-2017.
7
Morgan, supra note 4.
8
See generally Hacked Cameras, DVRs Powered Today’s Massive Internet
Outage, KREBSONSECURITY (Oct. 22, 2016), https://krebsonsecurity.com/
2016/10/hacked-cameras-dvrs-powered-todays-massive-internet-outage/. Unlike
the days when operating systems were only on computers, now they are in our
phones, on our TVs, in our Wi-Fi networks, in our speakers, and in our home
appliances. Why Your Chances of Getting Hacked Could Increase This Year, CBS
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/protect-yourself-from-emailhacking-cyber-threats/ [hereinafter Hacked].
3
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sonally identifiable information (“PII”), which is defined as anything that can be used to identify, locate, or contact a person.9 PII is
endlessly provided by consumers and collected by companies online
through the typical use of technology (think mouse-clicks, social
media likes, mobile apps, GPS updates, etc.).10 Juniper research
calls this the “digitization of consumers’ lives and enterprise records.”11
As PII increases, so does the vulnerability of consumer data theft
or data misuse.12 In this Note, “data theft” will refer to situations of
lost or stolen PII resulting from a data breach. This involves situations where companies (e.g., retailers, technology companies, health
systems, or financial institutions) are hacked and thereby lose consumer PII.13 On the other hand, “data misuse” will refer to the
wrongful or inaccurate exposure of PII on behalf of companies; this
involves situations where companies violate a consumer protection
statute. For example, by violating the Video Privacy Protection Act
of 1988 (“VPPA”),14 a company endangers the integrity of consumer PII. Put simply, data theft will deal with data breaches and
data misuse with a company’s violation of a consumer protection
statute.
Despite the increased threat of data theft by hackers and data
misuse by companies, the law and the governmental mechanisms
that create and enforce it (e.g., Congress, federal agencies, and the
Supreme Court) have struggled to adapt. The government must step
in to push for clearer privacy rights and liabilities, and to ensure that
the law catches up. “Fundamentally, the law is a powerful tool to

9
John Stringer, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information: What Data
is at Risk and What You Can Do About It, SOPHOS (Oct. 2011), https://www.sophos.com/en–us/medialibrary/pdfs/other/sophosprotectingpii.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Morgan, supra note 4.
12
Irina Raicu, Loss of Online Privacy: What’s the Harm?, MARKKULA
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/privacy/
loss–of–online–privacy–whats–the–harm/.
13
See e.g., Rick Robinson, The Top 5 Retail Breaches, SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 7, 2014), https://securityintelligence.com/the-top-5-retailbreaches/ (discussing data theft and breaches against retail stores).
14
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). The VPPA, among other functions, protects
against the unconsented dissemination a consumer’s personally identifiable rental
information. Id.
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assist with setting a . . . standard in data protection, [and in] providing a degree of security alongside flexibility for [companies] to approach their policies . . . .”15
While agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
have increased their limited efforts to protect consumers,16 Congress
and the Supreme Court have been slower to react. There is “no overarching framework legislation in place [for cybersecurity], but [instead] many enacted statutes [that] address various aspects of cybersecurity.”17 Therefore, there is a growing consensus that “the current
legislative framework for cybersecurity might need to be revised to
address needs for improved cybersecurity, especially given the continuing evolution of the technology and threat environments.”18 Crucially, this also means that some cybersecurity harms are statutorily
addressed, while some are not—a distinction between data theft and
data misuse.
The Supreme Court’s efforts are not much different, as the Court
has not provided anything more than minimal guidance regarding
privacy rights and liabilities. In its decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA19 (a quasi-data theft suit) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins20 (a data misuse suit), the Supreme Court “failed to articulate an
intellectual framework that can satisfactorily explain the results in

Liam Lambert, Cyber Security – Attacks, Effects and the Role of the Law,
MARKET MOGUL (Jan. 5, 2017), http://themarketmogul.com/cyber–security–attacks–effects–role–law/.
16
See e.g., FTC Testifies on Efforts to Protect Privacy and Security of Consumer Health Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 22, 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/news–events/press–releases/2016/03/ftc–testifies–efforts–protect–
privacy–security–consumer–health.
17
ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS
RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS,
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf.
The congressional report cites acts enacted from 1987 to 2002, demonstrating the
need for new acts. Id.
18
Id. at 1.
19
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
20
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
15
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[privacy] cases that are already decided, or that can be usefully employed to shape legal analysis in cases yet to come.”21 This has resulted in two federal circuit court splits, a post-Clapper and a postSpokeo split, which add to the chaos regarding consumer rights and
corresponding liabilities where PII is stolen or misused.22
This Note argues that the increased collection, exchange, and
dissemination of consumer PII, coupled with an upward trend in
cyberattacks, requires congressional action. Though Congress
should act to define privacy rights and protections, if its silence continues to drive the conversation, the Supreme Court may soon
(again) be in the unique position to provide guidance. When it has
the chance, considering what is at stake, the Court must be clearer
than it was in Clapper and Spokeo, which have led to uncertainty
over the state of litigation, consumers’ availability of redress, and
adequate cybersecurity thresholds.23
Part I highlights the urgency created by the frightening combination of technological innovations, the digitization of consumer
lives, sophisticated hackers, and governmental inadequacy. It also
explains the role of the law in defining consumer privacy through
the FTC, Congress, and the Supreme Court, which either create or
enforce such laws. Part II briefly explains the constitutional standing
requirements with a focus on the injury-in-fact requirement, which
is the crux of consumer protection suits like Clapper and Spokeo.
Parts III and IV, respectively, discuss the story of data theft and data
misuse in the court system. Specifically, each Part explains what led
to Clapper and Spokeo, the flawed analyses used to determine each
decision, and the resulting chaotic state. Part V demonstrates the
complexities of what is at stake for consumers and for companies,
with the goal of showing why Congress and the Court may be too
afraid to take a stance on anything privacy-related. Finally, Part VI
urges Congress to legislate, but anticipating congressional silence,
calls for the Supreme Court to clarify its position in data theft cases
and to defer to Congress in data misuse cases.

21
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290
(1988). While this Note speaks of standing in general, it reflects where privacy
standing currently stands as well.
22
See infra Parts III, IV.
23
Id.
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I. URGENT TIMES KNOCKING AT THE DOOR: SEARCHING FOR
LEADERSHIP
Today, “virtually every organization acquires, uses and stores
personally identifiable information.”24 As mentioned, PII includes
anything that can be used to identify, locate, or contact a person.25
While some may argue this information is not necessarily private,26
if it ends up in the wrong hands, it can be quite harmful.27 Cyberattacks leading to data theft or made possible by company misuse of
PII may cause consumers personal harm (e.g., a sense of insecurity
about one’s private affairs) or financial harm (e.g., fraudulent credit
card expenses or identity theft).28 According to a Norton study, as
of 2010, roughly three-quarters of U.S. web surfers had fallen victim
to cybercrimes including computer viruses, credit card fraud, and
identity theft.29
A.
A Lingering Threat Left Unsolved
Hackers do not discriminate. Many of the most prominent companies in the United States and abroad have been hacked over the
past three years. This includes extramarital affairs site Ashley Madison (37 million users exposed),30 Yahoo (three billion user accounts

24

Stringer, supra note 9.
Id.
26
See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (PIA) GUIDE 2 (2007), https://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/
piaguide.pdf (“PII should not be confused with ‘private’ information. Private information is information that an individual prefers not to make publicly known,
e.g., because of the information’s sensitive nature. Personally identifiable information is much broader in scope and includes all information that can be used to
directly or indirectly identify individuals.”).
27
What Are the Dangers of PII, PENN ARTS & SCIENCES (2010), http://yourdata.sas.upenn.edu/content/what–are–dangers–pii.
28
Id.
29
Eli Talmor, Cybercrime Victims Feel Ripped Off, INFOSEC ISLAND (Sept.
20, 2010), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/8042–Cybercrime–Victims–
Feel–Ripped–Off.html.
30
Frank Jennings, You’ve Been Hacked. What Are You Liable For?, THE
REGISTER (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/14/been_
hacked_what_are_you_liable_for/.
25
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exposed), Deloitte, Equifax, Chipotle, Verizon,31 the Federal Reserve,32 law firms like Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP 33 and Mossack Fonseca,34 JPMorgan Chase,35 and even the United States Presidential election (via the Democratic National Convention).36
With the expansion of smart technology and use of mobile platforms, the trend will probably only increase.37 As a consequence,
consumer trust is dropping and insecurity concerns are rising.38 Despite the increase in cybersecurity threats and the influx of PII,
“companies appear unaware of the growing trend in both the scale
and sophistication of cyber security threats.”39 For example, a
Ponemon Institute study revealed that “40 [percent] of companies
do not scan their mobile apps for security vulnerabilities”; almost
“40 percent of the more than 400 organizations surveyed do not review code for security weaknesses, and 33 percent never even test
their apps before release”; organizations do not have policies in
place for acceptable mobile app use; and most companies have not

31

See Burgess, supra note 6.
Jose Pagliery & Patrick Gillespie, Federal Reserve Under Attack by
Hacker Spies, CNN (June 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/01/technology/federal–reserve–hack/.
33
Sara Randazzo & Dave Michaels, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Traders
With Hacking Law Firms, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u–s–charges–three–chinese–traders–with–hacking–law–firms–1482862000.
34
This is the law firm that was breached in the “Panama Papers” scandal of
2016. Jessica Durando, Panama Papers: What We Know Now, USA TODAY (May
9, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/05/09/panama–papers–leak–documents–tax–shelters/84132964/.
35
Kevin Dugan, New Rule Would Require City Firms to Hire Cybersecurity
Officers, N.Y. POST (Sept. 13, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/09/13/new–rule–
would–require–city–firms–to–hire–cybersecurity–officers/.
36
Associated Press, Top US Intelligence Officials to Testify on Russian Hacking, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2017) http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/top–us–intelligence–
officials–to–testify–on–russian–hacking.html.
37
See Hacked, supra note 8 (“‘If you haven’t been hacked yet, the chances
are even greater in 2017.’”).
38
New Study Shows Public Does Not Trust Social Media Privacy, Supports
Stronger Privacy Laws, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://epic.org/2016/10/new–study–shows–public–does–no.html. In a survey
supported by the Craig New Mark Foundation, a majority of Americans “expressed concern about the lack of safety online, including fears over identity theft,
email hacking, and non–consensual online tracking.” Id.
39
Lambert, supra note 15.
32
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or do not know if they have inspected their cloud services for malware.40 This study is alarming, and to make matters worse, “[m]any
Americans think privacy laws are too weak,” including millennials,
who “are increasingly aware of the need for stronger privacy
laws.”41
What makes data theft cases so complicated (and data misuse so
potentially detrimental), is that hackers are often not caught.42
“Catching hackers remains a tough, tough job,” and “the police can’t
keep up.”43 This means the liability for data theft or misuse shifts
away from the culprit and to the companies and consumers. On one
end, companies should adapt their business practices to the changing
times.44 According to Garnet, an information technology research
company, “[o]rganizations should focus on how to detect and respond to malicious behaviors and incidents instead of trying to prevent every threat,” as they are doing now.45 On the other end, con-

40

Christine Kern, Ponemon Study Reveals Startling Lack of Security In Mobile Apps, INNOVATIVE RETAIL TECHS. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.innovativeretailtechnologies.com/doc/ponemon-study-reveals-startling-lack-of-security-in-mobile-apps-0001; Netskope and Ponemon Institute Study: Majority of
Businesses Have Not Inspected Cloud Services for Malware, NETSKOPE (Oct. 12,
2016,
https://www.netskope.com/press-releases/netskope-ponemon-institutestudy-majority-businesses-not-inspected-cloud-services-malware/ [hereinafter
Netskope].
41
Id.
42
James Andrew Lewis, the Senior Vice President and Director at Center for
Strategic International Studies, and an ex–Foreign Service officer, stated, “We
don’t catch most cybercriminals and we don’t catch the most successful . . . [s]o
far there is impunity for cybercriminals.” Tom Risen, Study: Hackers Cost More
Than $445 Billion Annually, U.S. NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2014/06/09/study–hackers–cost–more–than–445–billion–annually.
43
Charles Orton-Jones, Catching Hackers is Not Getting Easier,
RACONTEUR (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.raconteur.net/technology/catchinghackers-is-not-getting-easier.
44
See Lambert, supra note 15 (“The scale and vitriolic nature of attacks are
becoming more profound. Even with the well documented adverse effects of a
hack, many companies do not have sufficient policies in place to protect against
this threat nor do they possess an adequate response plan for an attack.”).
45
Christy Pettey & Rob van der Meulen, Gartner Says By 2020, 60 Percent
of Digital Businesses Will Suffer Major Service Failures Due to the Inability of
IT Security Teams to Manage Digital Risk, GARTNER (June 6, 2016), http://
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3337617.
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sumers must also bear some sort of burden of knowing how to handle sensitive information—who to give it to, when to expect its safekeeping, and knowing the risks of voluntarily handing it over.46
Though it is clear that these things must happen, the question
then becomes, which party, governmental or otherwise, should ensure that they do?
B.
An Absence of Congressional Efforts
At a time where consumers and companies are pitted against
each other—because hackers are typically not caught—Congress’
legislative efforts have failed to keep up.47 To its credit, some existing statutes protect consumers from risky business practices and regulate the exchange of sensitive information—to an extent.48 Currently, there are several prominent statutes:
 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”),49 designed
to regulate the collection of credit information;
 the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
(“FACTA”),50 designed to increase credit and debit card protection;
 the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977
(“FDCPA”),51 designed to battle abusive debt collection practices;

46
Computer Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0009-computer-security.
47
Martha Wrangham & Gretchen A. Ramos, Calls for Federal Breach Notification Law Continue After Yahoo Data Breach, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/calls–federal–breach–notification–law–
continue–after–yahoo–data–breach.
48
See Hacked, supra note 8 (“[P]ersonal data has become a huge area of concern, with strict new laws regarding the sharing and dissemination of medical history (HIPAA), misinformation in credit reports (Fair Credit Reporting Act), and
many others.”).
49
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
50
Id. § 1681c.
51
Id. § 1962.
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 the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“VPPA”),52 designed to protect video-related disclosures;
 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,53 designed
to restrict telephone solicitations; and
 the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”),54 designed, in part, to protect health information.
However, aside from HIPAA, which provides data breach notification guidelines and penalty guidelines for different types of
breaches,55 Congress has yet to pass any other statutes to incentivize
threshold cybersecurity measures or to guide companies’ reactions
to data breaches.56
Congress’ failed attempts at passing such data protection laws in
2014 and 2015 have stalled federal breach legislation.57 Instead,
there is an “existing spread of 47 state [breach notification] laws.”58
Even after Russia’s cyberattack on the United States’ 2016 Presidential election and the proposed creation of a new Senate Cybersecurity Subcommittee, there have been no more fruitful efforts on the
way.59 In the absence of such laws, the aftermath of a breach (the
most recent example being the Equifax breach that affected 145 mil-

52

18 U.S.C. § 2710.
15 U.S.C. § 552.
54
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.400–414; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d.
55
See STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, COMPARISON OF US STATE AND FEDERAL
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 188–92 (2016), https://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf.
56
See Wrangham & Ramos, supra note 47.
57
Id.
58
Id. For more information on the different state laws see generally STEPTOE
& JOHNSON LLP, supra note 55.
59
Jessica Schulberg & Laura Barrón-López, John McCain To Create New
Senate Cybersecurity Subcommittee, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/john–mccain–cybersecurity–subcommittee_us_586ec07ae4b099cdb0fc5c1d.
53
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lion Americans) follows a “familiar script: white-hot, bipartisan outrage, followed by hearings and a flurry of proposals that [go] nowhere.”60
“The lack of legislative response has industry groups and lawmakers . . . uttering a familiar refrain: Wait until next year.”61 Waiting until next year means companies and consumers are left to resort
to navigating forty-plus different state standards regarding data protection and breach response.62 It also means that uncertainty over
consumer rights and data protection guidelines does not seem likely
to be eased by Congress any time soon. In essence, it is hard to expect anything from Congress, which only leaves what it has in
place—the above-mentioned consumer protection statutes.
C.
The Limited Power of the Federal Trade Commission
The FTC is a congressionally created federal agency empowered
by the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 to regulate commerce.63 It serves as the chief federal agency on privacy policy and
consumer protection.64 Among other duties, it investigates companies and takes law enforcement action to ensure that companies are
keeping their promises and implementing adequate security
measures.65

60

Martin Matishak, After Equifax Breach, Anger but No Action in Congress,
POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/01/equifaxdata-breach-congress-action-319631.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
64
_Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about–ftc/bureaus–offices/bureau–consumer–protection
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
65
Id. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act empowers the agency to “prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (emphasis added). Unfair practices refer to when companies employ data security practices that cause or are
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. Deceptive practices refer to when
companies make materially misleading statements or omit material information
about their practices (usually on their privacy policies).
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While the FTC has increased focus on consumer protection,66 its
power is limited to the enforcement of laws.67 So, while the FTC
serves as a deterrent by writing privacy guidelines and fining companies, it does so only based on already established statutes.68
“While the FTC . . . has attempted to curb harmful practices by data
brokers . . . to protect consumers, there is very limited, if any, historical precedent for consumers’ ability to challenge the inappropriate aggregation and disclosure of their personal information.”69 In
sum, without new legislation, the FTC is limited in its fight to protect consumers against data theft and data misuse. Consumers affected by data theft or misuse would need to file suit in court to seek
monetary compensation for any harm caused,70 which means that,
at least for now, the judicial branch is at the forefront of the data
privacy issues.
D.
The Unfortunate Role of Constitutional Standing
As consumers seek redress for data theft and data misuse in
courts, and without any sign of congressional efforts coming, the
Supreme Court may find itself in the driver’s seat regarding laws for
data privacy and protection. It has already spoken on the issue, albeit
66
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to
Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s
Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news–events/press–
releases/2012/08/google–will–pay–225–million–settle–ftc–charges–it–misrepresented. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC, has stated that “[n]o matter how big
or small, all companies must abide by FTC orders against them and keep their
privacy promises to consumers, or they will end up paying many times what it
would have cost to comply in the first place.” Id. Also, recently the FTC increased
the maximum civil penalty amount from $16,000 to $40,000 for each day of the
violation. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Raises Civil Penalty Maximums to Adjust for Inflation (June 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news–
events/press–releases/2016/06/ftc–raises–civil–penalty–maximums–adjust–inflation.
67
See Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
68
See Rafae Bhatti, Standing in Privacy Lawsuits: Is the Tide Turning in Favor of Consumers? 5–6 (March 3, 2016) (unpublished comment), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741514.
69
Id.
70
Id. (“The standing to sue . . . is part of an important framework to enable
individuals allegedly harmed by data brokers to protect their own right of privacy.”).
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quite unclearly (as is demonstrated in Parts III and IV), in two cases
that extended to the privacy sphere: Clapper v. Amnesty International USA71 (a quasi-data theft suit) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins72 (a
data misuse suit).
In both Clapper and Spokeo, the Court gave blurry guidelines
focused on Article III constitutional standing; specifically, its injury-in-fact requirement.73 This created a circuit split regarding
standing for both data theft and data misuse cases, with many courts
unwilling to confer standing for consumer plaintiffs.74 Standing has
become such an obstacle that a federal magistrate judge has come to
describe it as the “Kilimanjaro” of data privacy cases.75
Because of the ensuing circuit splits the Court is likely to again
find itself in a position to define data privacy rights and liabilities
going forward—at least until Congress speaks. Because data privacy
litigation has centered on constitutional standing, Part II provides a
brief background, especially as it relates to privacy cases.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND THE
CONFUSING INJURY-IN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE
Brief Background
The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts through Article III’s case and controversy requirement.76 “No
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federalcourt jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”77 Where the
Court finds an actual case or controversy, it gives plaintiffs standing
71

568 U.S. 398 (2013).
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
73
See infra Parts III, IV.
74
See Bhatti, supra note 68, at 4; see also John Biglow, It Stands to Reason:
An Argument for Article III Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data
Breach Litigation, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 943, 943 (2016).
75
In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 WL 6248499, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
76
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 492–93 (2009); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41
(2006).
77
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (citation
omitted).
72
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to sue, which ensures they have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [their] invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction . . . .”78
To establish standing, (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury-in-fact” that is “concrete and particularized”; (2) the plaintiff’s
injury must be traceable to the defendant’s alleged conduct; and (3)
the plaintiff’s injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.79 This Note focuses solely on the injury-in-fact element, as it is the focus of standing in privacy cases.
Injury-In-Fact Requirements and Privacy Suits
The Supreme Court defined the characteristics of an injury-infact: the injury must be (1) “an invasion of a legally protected interest,” (2) that is “concrete and particularized,” and (3) that is “actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”80 Unfortunately, the
Court’s prolonged lack of guidance for assessing these requirements
has caused scholars to critique standing jurisprudence and lower
courts to produce inconsistent results.81
The presence of an injury-in-fact is crucial in privacy litigation,
as it often leads to early dismissals for a lack of standing.82 For data
theft cases, the main contention is whether the threat of future harm
is sufficiently imminent.83 A court’s holding on the imminence of
harm opens or closes the door to plaintiffs who seek compensation
for the costs of data theft. Such expenses include mitigation costs,
78

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
79
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
80
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560).
81
See generally Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 492 (1974) (suggesting that the standing question should not be injury-in-fact, but cause of action); David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42
(same).
82
See Amanda Fitzsimmons, et al., Seventh Circuit: Victims of Data
Breaches Have Article III Standing to Litigate Class Action Lawsuits, DLA PIPER
(July 23, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/07/
seventh-circuit-victims-of-data-breaches/ (“[A]n overwhelming majority of
courts have dismissed data breach consumer class actions at the outset due to a
lack of cognizable injury-in-fact[.]”).
83
See infra Part III.

2018]

DEFINING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL WORLD

1041

like credit monitoring services to protect themselves from fraud,84
unjust enrichment costs from the overpayment of services that they
believed would keep their PII secure (e.g., credit monitoring),85 a
loss in the intrinsic value of their PII,86 or emotional distress caused
by the threat of harm.87
For data misuse cases (like Spokeo), courts examine whether an
injury is sufficiently concrete by looking at whether the violated
statutory provision is tied to a legally protected interest.88 All of the
same injuries alleged in data theft cases may apply, in addition to
the statutory violation possibly being a constitutional harm in and of
itself.89
LEGALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS AS A VIOLATION OF THE
LAW
Legally protected interests may include common law rights such
as those established in property, contract, and tort law, as well as
constitutional rights and statutory rights created by Congress.90 Absent an acknowledgement by the legal system and “until some

See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 819 F.3d 963, 964 (2016)
(plaintiff sought compensation for the time and expense incurred to prevent and
monitor fraudulent charges after a data breach).
85
Plaintiffs allege that they overpaid for services because they paid for a certain service relying on the idea that such a payment included the adequate security
of their information. See e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193, 202
(D.D.C. 2016) (plaintiffs alleged that the payment they inherently paid in security
as part of their full payment “[was] not equivalent [to] the security value” actually
provided). Id.
86
Plaintiffs allege that the value of their personal information has decreased
as a result of a breach or misuse of their information. See e.g., Attias, 2016 WL
4250232, at *5 (plaintiffs argued that data breach “negatively impacted [the datas]
value.”).
87
See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011) (plaintiff
alleged “an increased risk of identity theft, . . . costs to monitor their credit activity, and . . . emotional distress” as harm) (emphasis added).
88
See infra Part IV.
89
See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 994–95 (11th Cir.
2016) (finding violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as sufficient for
constitutional harm because it conferred a right to adequate disclosures).
90
See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Val. Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939)
(“[T]he right invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising out of contract,
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers
84
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source of law creates a relevant legal interest and a right to bring
suit,” a factual injury may not typically suffice for standing.91
With regards to privacy and consumer protection, the question
becomes whether there exists an “understanding of law”92 sufficient
to create a legally protected interest in the correct use, adequate protection, and appropriate dissemination of one’s PII. In other words,
while Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged “the
right to privacy [as] a personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States,”93 it remains to be consistently
determined whether today’s privacy—the protection of personal
data such as PII—is a legally conferred right.
CONCRETE AND PARTICULARIZED REQUIREMENT
Prior to Spokeo, courts tended to treat the concrete and particularized elements as one—now they are separately analyzed.94 Particularity ties into the idea that federal courts do not owe protection
to “generalized grievances,” which are injuries “often said to be suffered ‘by all or a large class of citizens.’”95 The generalized grievance doctrine “is based on the notion that if parties seek to redress
public harms, they must do so via the political branches and not the
courts.”96 As for the second requirement, the definition of concreteness remains fuddled and is a major point of contention in privacy
a privilege.”) (footnote omitted), abrogated by Bond v. United States, 564 U.S.
211 (2011).
91
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639–40 (1999).
92
Id. at 641.
93
5 § U.S.C. 552(a) (2012).
94
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
95
Ryan Guilds, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances As A
Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (1996) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). “Generalized grievances are a subcomponent of standing doctrine and encompass a set of doctrinal limitations on
federal court access.” Id.
96
Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV.
221, 221 (2008). For example, prior cases like Defenders of Wildlife stated that
for standing purposes, citizens would have to show that they are affected in a
personal and individual way in the sense that their grievances were not widely
shared. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 639–40. This stemmed from the idea that
“the role of the courts is to protect individual rights, and that when numerous
people are . . . injured, their remedy is political rather than judicial.” Antonin
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litigation.97 In theory, concreteness means that an injury must be de
facto—it “must actually exist” and be “real and not abstract.”98
ACTUAL OR IMMINENT REQUIREMENT
Generally, the actual or imminent injury requirement means that
injuries cannot be speculative or hypothetical.99 However, a threat
of injury may be sufficient “if the injury is certainly impending.”100
As with concreteness, the Supreme Court has not provided clear
guidance as to when a plaintiff crosses the probability threshold for
risk of harm to become certainly impending. The imminence required is unknown.101
To recap, privacy litigation centers around the injury-in-fact requirement of constitutional standing, which is unclear and undeveloped. In data theft cases, which invoke Clapper, the focus is on the
concreteness and imminence of the alleged harm, and in data misuse
cases, like Spokeo, the focus is also on whether the harm is legally
cognizable.
III.

CLAPPER’S FAILED ATTEMPT TO DEFINE IMMINENCE IN
DATA BREACH SUITS

A Necessary Disclaimer
This Note deals exclusively with data theft cases where plaintiffs
allege a risk of future harm absent any other actual harm.102 In other
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (“I suggest that courts need to
accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement
that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one, which sets him apart
from the citizenry at large.”). In other words, one should turn to Congress for a
remedy, which in turn can then legislate and, in theory, create standing for individuals who share any injury.
97
See infra Part III.
98
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
99
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
100
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
101
See, e.g., id. at 1142–45 (providing two separate standards for imminence:
the certainly impending standard and the substantial risk standard).
102
Cf. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398–99 (2014) (listing
two classes of data breach cases: Class I cases in which the plaintiff has suffered
a financial loss stemming from a data breach, and Class II cases in which the
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words, data theft means just that—data theft without anything more.
This distinction is made because it is already largely settled that in
cases of actual misuse of information by hackers, a plaintiff has suffered “ongoing, present, distinct, and palpable harms” sufficient for
standing.103 On the other hand, federal circuit courts are split on
whether injuries from data theft alone, which involve future harm or
preventive measures to avoid future harm, are sufficient for constitutional standing.104
The Creation of a Circuit Split for Imminence of Harm
At first, the threat of future harm following data theft seemed
like it would be sufficient for standing. The Seventh Circuit held in
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,105 a case of first impression, that
where customers’ names, addresses, social security numbers,
driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and other financial information were stolen,106 the plaintiffs had standing because of their
alleged mitigation costs. They had “incurred expenses in order to
prevent their confidential personal information from being used and
continue to incur expenses in the future.”107 In Krottner v. Starbucks
Corp.,108 the Ninth Circuit held similarly that breach victims who
had their “names, addresses, and social security numbers” stolen alleged a future threat of harm.109
plaintiff has taken steps to prevent future harm stemming from a data breach or
they have alleged that future harm is imminent due to a data breach). This Note
deals exclusively with “Class II” cases.
103
Enslin v. The Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 664 (2015) (finding an
injury-in-fact where plaintiff alleged theft of funds from his bank accounts, unauthorized use of credit cards, and the unauthorized issuance of new credit cards);
see also In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159
(D. Minn. 2014) (finding plaintiffs to have standing where their credit cards were
used to make unauthorized purchases).
104
See Biglow, supra note 74, at 943.
105
499 F.3d 629, 631–34 (7th Cir. 2007).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
109
Id. at 1143. The court found that the plaintiffs had “alleged a credible threat
of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their
unencrypted personal data” that was different from more “conjectural or hypothetical allegations,” such as if, “[p]laintiffs had sued based on the risk that it
would be stolen at some point in the future.” Id.
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However, the Third Circuit created a split in Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp., which denied standing on similar facts.110 The plaintiffs “first
name[s], last name[s], social security number[s] . . . birth date[s]
and[] the bank account[s] that [are] used for direct deposit”111 were
stolen by hackers.112 The court found that “an increased risk of identity theft . . . costs to monitor their credit activity, and . . . emotional
distress,” were hypothetical and “attenuated, because [they were]
dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown
third-party.”113
Clapper as the Answer?
In 2013, the Supreme Court heard Clapper, which though not
particularly catered to a data theft setting, would examine the future
threat of harm—imminence—as to standing.114 The case arose because Section 1881a of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowed the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire intelligence through the surveillance of individuals
who were not “United States persons.”115 The plaintiffs (U.S. citizen
attorneys, human rights activists, media organizations, and others)
alleged that, because they regularly engaged in “international communications with individuals who [were] likely targets of surveillance,” they had to take costly and burdensome measures to protect
the confidentiality of such communications, which would likely be
acquired through the Section 1881 protocol. 116
The Court denied standing because plaintiffs “[did not] demonstrate [that] the future injury . . . [was] certainly impending and because they [could not] manufacture standing by incurring costs in

110

664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. The court explained that the speculation included having to believe that
the hacker “read, copied, and understood their personal information; . . . intends
to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and . . . is able to use
such information to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in Appellants’ names.” Id.
114
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407–22 (2013).
115
Id. at 404–05.
116
Id. at 406–07.
111
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anticipation of non-imminent harm.”117 Their allegations, the Court
stated, relied on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”118
On its face, this was a final blow to data theft consumers who
also had to take costly precautions to avoid future harm. Many believed Clapper would end data theft suits solely grounded on future
harm claims.119 “While Clapper was not a data breach case, its analysis is particularly applicable in such cases where the plaintiff’s sole
allegation of harm is that he is in imminent danger of future harm
by virtue of his identity having been stolen.”120
The Circuit Split Persists Through the “Substantial Risk”
Standard
While various courts agreed with Clapper and quickly dismissed
claims,121 the Seventh Circuit did not. In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Grp., LLC, it re-established the split when it found standing in a data
theft case, stating that “Clapper does not . . . foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to support Article III standing.”122 In Remijas, the plaintiffs had their credit card numbers stolen and alleged
that, because “unreimbursed fraudulent charges and identity theft
may happen,” they had to incur “necessary” and “immediate preventative measures.”123 Remijas relied on a lower standard of imminence cited in a footnote in Clapper, which stated that sometimes
“[the Court] found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the
harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur
costs to mitigate or avoid the harm.”124
117

Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
Id. at 410.
119
See Does Clapper Silence Data Breach Litigation? A Two-Year Retrospective, INFOLAWGROUP LLP (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.infolawgroup.com/
2015/02/articles/breach-notice/does-clapper-silence-data-breach-litigation-atwo-year-retrospective/ (discussing the possibility that Clapper could silence data
breach litigation).
120
Torres v. Wendy’s Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
121
Most courts, consistent with Clapper, rejected the threat of future harm as
insufficient. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 2016 WL 4250232, at *2 (D.D.C.
Aug. 10, 2016) (finding the risk of harm too speculative); In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–59 (D. Nev. 2015).
122
794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
123
Id. at 692.
124
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court acknowledged the substantial risk threshold as lower
118
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The Seventh Circuit distinguished Remijas from Clapper because it was not speculative that the theft itself occurred: “[t]he
hackers deliberately targeted Neiman Marcus to obtain [the plaintiffs’] credit-card information.”125 The court asked, “[w]hy else
would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’
identities.”126 The Seventh Circuit reiterated its stance in Lewert v.
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, where it held that customers whose
credit and debit card data was stolen had a concrete injury composed
of the time and expense spent to prevent and monitor fraudulent
charges.127 Confusingly, it applied a “certainly impending” standard.128
With the Ninth and Seventh Circuits conferring standing and the
Third Circuit denying it, a split still exists.129 It is also unclear if the
substantial risk or certainly impending standard applies to data theft.
Without any legislation on data theft and with continuing confusion
in the courts, obscurity plagues data theft rights and liabilities.
IV.

SPOKEO FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE AVENUE FOR
STANDING

An Opportunity for Related Clarity
Clapper left a guidance gap—consumer victims, attorneys, and
courts could not predictably gauge whether post-data theft risk of
harm was sufficiently imminent for standing. Consequently, these
parties anticipated that Spokeo—which considered the related question of whether a plaintiff could overcome a standing challenge

than certainly impending by stating that “[Clapper] respondents [fell] short of
even that standard.” Id.
125
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
126
Id.
127
819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016).
128
The “increased risk of fraudulent credit- or debit-card charges, and the increased risk of identity theft” were “certainly impending” future harms. Id. at 966.
129
Compare id. (conferring standing), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 658
F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (conferring standing), with Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing).
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solely on a company’s violation of a consumer protection statute130—could offer assistance. Spokeo could potentially allow victims of data misuse and some victims of data theft (if there was a
statutory violation involved as well) to seek redress in federal courts
through a different avenue, that of statutorily conferred standing.131
The Creation of the Concreteness Conundrum
Spokeo arose when Thomas Robins, the named plaintiff, discovered an inaccurate profile of himself on Spokeo, a consumer reporting agency that operates a search engine.132 Spokeo gathers data
about people and creates a profile of them.133 Robins’ profile falsely
asserted that he was married (he was not), had children (he did not),
was in his late 50s (he was younger), had a job (he was looking for
one), was affluent (he was not), and held a graduate degree (he did
not).134 He filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Spokeo violated the FCRA by failing to “follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy [of information].”135 The harm, he
alleged, was that the inaccurate profile caused him to miss out on
employment opportunities because it “made him appear overqualified . . . expectant of a higher salary . . . and less mobile . . . .”136
In its analysis, the Court focused exclusively on the particularization and concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact analysis.137 The
Court held that Robins’ claims were particularized, without much

130
Brandon N. Robinson & Gregory C. Cook, One Month Later: Reflections
On the Impact of Spokeo, LAW360 (June 20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/807734/one-month-later-reflections-on-the-impact-of-spokeo (“The much
anticipated question that the court was asked to address revolved around whether
Robins could bring a claim under the FCRA based solely on the publishing of
inaccurate information alone, without evidence of any actual injury.”).
131
Id.
132
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544–46 (2016).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1546.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 1546–47 (majority opinion).
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discussion.138 Regarding concreteness, the Court remanded the analysis back to the Ninth Circuit.139 In dictum, it provided limited guidance by stating that an injury must be de facto—it “must actually
exist” and be “real and not abstract.”140 Concrete is “not necessarily
synonymous with ‘tangible.’”141
Most importantly, it stated that courts should look at history and
congressional judgment to determine concreteness.142 Regarding
history, courts must consider if the “intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing
basis for a lawsuit.”143 Regarding congressional judgment, Congress
is “well positioned to identify intangible harms” and may elevate the
status of an injury to “concrete” by conferring statutory rights.144
But, the Court also provided the conflicting view that a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement.145 Even more confusing, the Court
also wrote that in some circumstances, “the violation of a procedural
right granted by statute can be sufficient . . . to constitute injury-in-

138

See id. at 1548. Because Spokeo violated his statutory rights and because
he had a personal interest in the handling of his credit information, the Court found
his injury sufficiently particularized. Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1549 (providing that, for example, the risk of real harm is an intangible harm that may satisfy concreteness).
142
Id.
143
Id.; see, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 775–77 (2000) (justifying Article III standing for a “qui tam relator
[claim] under the False Claims Act” because qui tam actions were historically
prevalent in America and England).
144
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
145
Id. As an example, the Court explains that while Congress sought to stop
the “dissemination of false information” by enacting the FCRA and adopting procedures such as the one allegedly violated by Spokeo, a “bare procedural violation
[of the FCRA]” would not satisfy Article III because it may result in no harm. Id.
at 1550 (“not all inaccuracies [by FCRA regulated agencies] cause harm or present any material risk of harm”). “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination
of an incorrect zip code . . . could work any concrete harm.” Id.

1050

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1025

fact,”146 and a plaintiff does not have to allege “additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”147
In short, Spokeo left an unclear understanding of concreteness
and failed to state whether a congressional statute ordering companies to safeguard or display PII in certain ways is sufficient for
standing. The Court merely provided history and congressional
judgment as talking points for concreteness (without actually doing
the analysis itself) and vaguely differentiated between procedural
and substantive statutory violations.
A Post-Spokeo Circuit Split
Spokeo’s lack of clarity resulted in a brewing circuit split—the
case has “produced divergent decisions in cases with similar fact
patterns.”148 It remains unclear whether a mere statutory violation is
sufficient for standing in privacy claims.149 While the Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit demonstrated an expansive view of Spokeo
(conferring standing), the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,
showed a restrictive view (denying standing).150 As demonstrated
146

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.; see, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998)
(confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain information” that Congress
had decided to make public is sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III).
148
Allison Grande, Spokeo Split: How High Court’s Ruling is Being Interpreted, LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/865734/
spokeo-split-how-high-court-s-ruling-is-being-interpreted.
149
David Lender, et al., A Circuit Split Emerges As Lower Courts Weigh In
On Spokeo, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/839978/
a-circuit-split-emerges-as-lower-courts-weigh-in-on-spokeo.
150
See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 991–92 (11th Cir.
2016) (conferring standing where, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff received a letter by the defendant that omitted certain statutorily required disclosures causing plaintiff to get “very angry” and “cr[y] a
lot.”); see also Galaria v. Nat’l Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 385 (6th Cir.
2016) (conferring standing in a data breach case where the plaintiff alleged an
FCRA violation). But see Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 513–
15 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (defendant’s violation of the D.C. Consumer Identification
Information Act and the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act by requesting
customers’ zip codes in connection with credit card purchases is not a concrete
Article III injury); see also Braitberg v. Charter Comm., Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930–
31 (8th Cir. 2016) (defendant’s cable company’s retention of personal information
in violation of Cable Communications Policy Act does not merit standing without
some other harm); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 728–
147
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by the following chart (Chart 1) compiled by attorneys at Morgan
Lewis & Bockius LLP, after Spokeo, courts have inconsistently determined standing founded on consumer protection statutes (even in
cases with the same statute):
Chart 1151

FACTA
FCRA
FDCPA
TCPA
Other
TOTAL

Standing No Standing
4
4
18
25
24
3
23
6
36
30
105
68

Totals
8
43
27
29
66
173

Percent Finding Standing
50%
42%
89%
79%
55%
61%

While it may be that this split is due in part to the different nature
and factual requirements of statutes, the courts’ differing analyses
demonstrate that there is more than just a factual inconsistency
within these cases. While courts often employed the historical and
congressional intent analysis suggested by Spokeo,152 they have carried it out in a highly inconsistent manner, leading to unpredictable
results. The following subsections explain how courts have been applying each prong.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS INCONSISTENCIES
Courts with an expansive view of Spokeo (that conferred standing) typically make it a point to recognize the right to privacy as a
traditional common law cause of action.153 This recognition alone
29 (7th Cir. 2016) (the sole failure to truncate a credit card’s expiration date as
required by FACTA is insufficient to confer Article III standing).
151
Ezra D. Church, et al., Spokeo 6 Months Later: An Undeniably Dramatic
Impact, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/839978/
spokeo-6-months-later-an-undeniably-dramatic-impact.
152
See, e.g., Holderread v. Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC, 2016 WL 6248707,
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) (“As directed by Spokeo, the Court should first
consider the history of the intangible harm and Congress’s judgment.”).
153
See Matera v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 5339806, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2016) (finding that, for centuries, common law had recognized the right to privacy, which the Wiretap Act sought to protect); see also Yershov v. Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 353, 362 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding that
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bolsters the strength of the statutory provision that has been violated
because it alludes to something that the Supreme Court has recognized for standing in the past. On the other hand, courts that have
rejected standing do not acknowledge the right to privacy as a cause
of action.154 Nevertheless, this is vaguely and arbitrarily applied.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT INCONSISTENCIES
Courts have had difficulty differentiating between statutorily
created procedural and substantive rights. While Spokeo clearly
stated that virtually155 all procedural violations are insufficient for
standing, it only provided one example of what would qualify as a
procedural right: the correct dissemination of a zip code as required
by the FCRA.156 As a consequence, lower courts have either merely
compared the statutory provision in question to the dissemination of
an incorrect zip code, or just assumed conclusively that a right is
substantive or procedural.157 The former method is inefficient because the FCRA’s correct zip code requirement does not establish
much of a guidepost,158 and the latter method because it serves no
precedential purpose.

the VPPA protected “an individual’s right to privacy . . . as to certain personal
information and private locations,” which had long been regarded as a basis for a
lawsuit) (emphasis added); Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp.
3d 850, 857–58 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding the TCPA codifies the common law tort
of right to privacy and seclusion).
154
See, e.g., Hancock, 830 F.3d at 511 (right to privacy not acknowledged).
155
In some cases, such as FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), standing was
merited with a mere procedural violation. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1549 (2016). Akins involved “statutory rights intended to protect and promote
public interests”—citizens’ right to information that should have been publicly
disclosed about candidates running for public office. Id.
156
The Court stated that dissemination of an incorrect zip code may violate
the FCRA, but that it is “difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect
zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at
1550.
157
See Hancock, 830 F.3d at 511; see also Braitberg v. Charter Comm., Inc.,
836 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 2016).
158
The only time this works well is when the case deals with extremely similar
provisions as Spokeo, such as Hancock. 830 F.3d at 512. There, the defendant
violated D.C.’s Consumer Identification Information Act by requesting zip codes
from plaintiffs during credit card purchases, and the court found that plaintiffs
“assert[ed] only a bare violation of the requirements.” Id.
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Furthermore, courts have inconsistent ways of distinguishing
cases using Spokeo’s zip code example: some use the prohibitive
language of a statute as a key to finding substantive rights,159 and
others equate procedural rights to duties.160 Other cases, like Matera
v. Google Inc.,161 demonstrate how some courts apply an arbitrary
and conclusive analysis to distinguishing between a procedural and
a substantive right of action. There, the plaintiff alleged that Google
violated the Wire Tap Act because it unlawfully intercepted the contents of Gmail messages.162 Without giving much explanation, the
court found that the Wire Tap Act created a substantive right of action.163 This is not the only time that a court has employed this type
of conclusory analysis.164

159
See Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (N.D.
Ill. 2016). There, the court conferred standing, by distinguishing a TCPA provision based on the fact that it “prohibit[ed] making certain kinds of telephonic contact” without consumers’ consent, instead of “requiring the adoption of procedures to decrease congressionally-identified risks.” Id. The court stated that, unlike where an agency violates the FCRA by reporting an incorrect zip code (and,
thus, the “procedural rights . . . are attenuated enough from the interests Congress
identified and sought to protect through the FCRA”), “the TCPA section at issue
does not require the adoption of procedures to decrease congressionally-identified
risks.” Id. Instead, it “prohibits making certain kinds of telephonic contact” without consumers’ consent. Id.
160
See Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 931. There, the court equated procedural rights
to duties and denied standing on the basis that the right was procedural because it
created a duty. See id. (stating that “FCRA . . . provides that consumer reporting
agencies must ‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy’ of consumer reports.”). The plaintiff alleged that defendant, his ex-cable
provider, violated the Cable Communications Policy Act when it kept his PII after
he canceled the service. Id. at 927. The court found that a bare procedural right—
the duty to destroy PII—was insufficient for standing. Id.
161
2016 WL 5339806, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23. 2016).
162
Id.
163
Id. It merely stated that while the dissemination of an incorrect zip code
violated a “reasonable [FCRA] procedure,” the Wiretap Act created “substantive
rights to privacy in one’s communications.”
164
See Yershov v. Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 353,
362 n.5 (D. Mass. 2016) (conclusively stating that the VPPA created a “substantive right to prevent and remedy” the type of disclosure performed by Gannet);
Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 991–92 (11th Cir. 2016)
(conclusively finding a substantive right to receive disclosures without additional
explanation).
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Even worse, some courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Meyers v.
Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, do not distinguish between procedural and substantive rights and just make a blanket assumption that
standing requires an additional injury to the statutory violation.165
Through all of these different methods, courts—unsurprisingly—
have interpreted the same statutes and ended up with opposite holdings on standing.166
COURTS IGNORE THE SPOKEO ANALYSIS AND MAINTAIN THE
STATUS QUO
Finally, some courts forego the statutory analysis suggested by
Spokeo and confer standing solely on the imminence of harm (under
the Clapper analysis).167 It is as if Spokeo did not change anything.168 One district court even claimed that Spokeo “essentially affirmed” the intangible injury requirements set forth in Clapper.169
In sum, Clapper and Spokeo have done very little, if anything,
to help define privacy rights and liabilities. So, why has the Supreme
Court been so vague?

165
843 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). There, the court denied standing because
consumers showed no actual injury other than that the defendant had failed to
properly truncate credit card expiration dates in accordance with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. See id. (stating that “Congress enacted the
FACTA in response to what it considered to be the increasing threat of identity
theft.”). The court concluded that regardless of whether the right was substantive
or procedural, its violation required an accompanying injury. Id. at 728–29.
166
See Church, supra note 151 and accompanying Chart 1.
167
In re Zappos.com, a data breach case, is an example. In re Zappos.com,
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2016 WL 4521681, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug.
29, 2016). There, the court denied standing, claiming that plaintiffs did not suffer
actual damages as a result of the breach. Id. at *3. On the other hand, in Galaria,
another data breach case, the court conferred standing based on the imminent risk
of the harm and remanded the FCRA claim (ignoring the Spokeo analysis). Galaria
v. Nat’l Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 391–93 (6th Cir. 2016).
168
U.S. District Judge James Donato said that he was “skeptical that . . .
Spokeo . . . was a ‘big change of law.’” Dorothy Atkins, Facebook’s Spokeo Bid
to End Privacy Suit Faces Skepticisim, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/856826/facebook-s-spokeo-bid-to-end-privacy-suit-faces-skepticism. He further stated, “‘[i]t’s old law simply restated . . .
[and] [t]here’s nothing particularly novel about it.’” Id.
169
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 2016 WL 4521681, at *1.
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V. WHY SO SILENT: THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSIGNING LIABILITY IN
DATA PRIVACY
It may well be that Congress is yet to legislate and that the Court
may have erred on the side of being vague (in both Spokeo and Clapper) because of the impending policy implications attached to any
decisive move related to data privacy. It is important to understand
what is at stake and why assigning rights and liabilities is so difficult
in the privacy space: if consumers can earn standing easily, a floodgate may open, and if it is too hard for them to earn standing, one of
their last few avenues for redress may be closed.
The Problem of the Disappearing Culprit
What makes privacy cases so complicated and difficult to address is that hackers—the truly liable criminals—are virtually never
caught.170 Many times “cybergangs” can complete remote work
through “zombie computers,” which makes it increasingly difficult
to locate the hackers.171 As cybercrime costs quadrupled from 2013
to 2015 (and continue to increase),172 cyber attackers continue uncaught.
Who Should Take the Hit: Consumers or Companies?
Unable to sue the culprits, both companies and consumers must
turn elsewhere for redress. If companies implement its security system through a certified vendor, they may be able to sue such vendor.173 Also, companies sometimes buy cyber insurance to lower the
costs of a breach.174 On the other hand, consumers may try to sue
170
James Andrew Lewis, the Senior Vice President and Director at Center for
Strategic International Studies, and an ex-Foreign Service officer, stated that
“most cybercriminals . . . and the most successful ones are not caught . . . [and]
so far there is impunity for cybercriminals.” See Tom Risen, supra note 42.
171
Elinor Mills, Finjan Finds Botnet of 1.9 million Infected Computers, CNET
(Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.cnet.com/news/finjan-finds-botnet-of-1-9-millioninfected-computers/.
172
See Morgan, supra note 4.
173
Kristin Casler, Data Breach Defenses When Consumer Plaintiffs Come
Knocking, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2016/08/15/data-breach-defenses-when-consumer-plaintiffs-come-knocking.aspx.
174
Id.
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the company—the custodian of their PII—but may encounter constitutional standing obstacles.175 This is because constitutional
standing is the “first avenue of defense” for defendant companies.176
Regardless of the varying potential scenarios, from a legislative
and judicial standpoint, any future laws or court decisions will essentially decide how to spread liability between consumers and
companies. Keeping in mind the respective availability for redress,
this Note now examines the policy implications of privacy legislation and jurisprudence. As an introduction, consider the following:
When it comes to protection of online privacy, you
will probably hear the claim that some measures, if
implemented, would prevent innovation or destroy
the Internet altogether. You will also hear the claim
that without protective measures we will . . . end up
with a society that sees people as nothing more than
consumers.177
CONSUMER RISKS AND FRIGHT IN A DATA DRIVEN SOCIETY
One could argue that laws should shift liability away from consumers and instead protect them because of the urgent threat of identity theft and other consumer harms caused by data theft and made
more likely by data misuse. By providing PII to companies, consumers risk their financial stability, their identity, and potentially even
their mental or physical safety.178 For the fifteenth consecutive year,
175

Maria Vathis & David Zetoony, The Cybersecurity Question: To Insure Or
Not To Insure, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/
481543/the-cybersecurity-question-to-insure-or-not-to-insure.
176
Gerald D. Silver, Tips For Defending Data Breach Class Actions, LAW360
(Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/421934/tips-for-defendingagainst-data-breach-class-actions. A dismissal means consumers may no longer
argue on the merits nor seek redress for harms. Id.
177
Irina Raicu, Are Attitudes about Privacy Changing?, MARKKULA CTR. FOR
APPLIED ETHICS (June 1, 2012), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/privacy/are-attitudesabout-privacy-changing/ [hereinafter Attitudes].
178
See M. GRANGER MORGAN, ET AL., THE MANY MEANINGS OF “SMART
GRID” 5 (2009), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&
context=epp. For instance, a hacker could monitor Smart Grid power usage to
determine when a consumer is at work, facilitating burglary, unauthorized entry,
or worse. Id. See also Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and
Thirty-Two Technical Experts and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
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identity theft is the top complaint among consumers.179 In 2012
alone, more than sixteen-million Americans fell victim to identity
thefts, costing over twenty-four-billion dollars—fourteen-billion
dollars more than losses attributed to burglary, theft, automobile
theft, and all other property crimes.180 Without adequate company
safeguards, hackers can “collect[] consumer profiles that would give
them a clear picture of consumers’ habits over time, thereby enabling them to predict passwords, challenge questions, or other authentication credentials.”181
While companies may lose money (and in some scenarios, corporate livelihood) from misused or stolen information, individual
victims risk a value unique to them because they face “special
threats to [their] ability to structure their lives in unconventional
ways.”182 Privacy incursions can cause uniquely detrimental and irreparable effects on individuals.183 Research in cognitive psychology shows that a “lack of privacy stunts social development and
growth, neither of which is fungible or replaceable in human beings.”184
Furthermore, consumers’ right to privacy includes the right to
manage and control their personal data, which helps “individuals
Respondent at 5, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339)
[hereinafter Brief for EPIC] (“Many consumers are unable to obtain jobs or credit
because of inaccurate or incomplete information made available by data brokers.”).
179
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Identity Theft Tops FTC’s Consumer
Complaint Categories Again in 2014 (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/02/identity-theft-tops-ftcs-consumer-complaint-categories-again-2014.
180
See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Stat., 16.6 Million People Experienced
Identity Theft in 2012 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/
vit12pr.cfm.
181
FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commissionmay-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
182
Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117,
2121 (2001).
183
See Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 52, 54 (2007).
184
Brief for EPIC, supra note 178 (citing Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426
n.195 (2000)).
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avoid the embarrassment that accompanies the disclosure of certain
personal details”; “to preserve human dignity, respect, and autonomy”; and “[to] construct intimacy with others.”185 This line of
thinking is tied to a control theory, which conceptualizes privacy as
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.”186 It follows that companies are in a
better position to protect that control because they are the custodians
of private information.187 Therefore, the company in possession
should bear the consequences of data misuse or theft.188
The FTC has stated that there is a power imbalance between customers and the companies with which they conduct business, especially for companies offering important services such as utilities,
which leaves consumers relatively disempowered and without
meaningful choice.189 Others take a step further, arguing that the
collection of PII facilitates a company’s power to influence or direct
consumer behavior.190 “The ability of a company—a company that
you have no relationship with—to know where you live, your de-

185

Id. (citing Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–16, 1260 (1998)).
186
Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 766 (2007) (explaining “the control
we have over information about ourselves” and the importance of maintaining that
control to avoid resulting in “a suffocating powerlessness and vulnerability” from
its loss).
187
See Bruce Schneier, When It Comes to Security, We’re Back to Feudalism,
WIRED (Nov. 26, 2012) https://www.wired.com/2012/11/feudal-security/ (“We
give companies our data and trust them with our security, but we receive very few
assurances of protection in return, and those companies have very few restrictions
on what they can do.”).
188
Id.
189
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE 51 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. Typically, the business-consumer relationship is already relatively onesided. For example, for important services, contracts are typically dictated and
may be changed at will by companies. Id.
190
See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1953 (2013).
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mographics, your interests, and how to contact you is unprecedented.”191 To summarize the arguments against precluding consumers from redress:
None of this is acceptable because it allocates the risk
of loss to consumers even though they are in no position to prevent the breach and allows the merchant
to escape liability in proximately-caused harms even
though it has the power and resources to minimize
the risk of these breaches.192
CORPORATE LENIENCY FOR INNOVATION AND FAIRNESS
There are also strong arguments for corporate leniency, including the protection of innovation, the level of sophistication of modern hackers, the difficulty of making changes so quickly, and the
already costly repercussions for victim companies. First, as the role
of Congress and the Supreme Court “remains central to defining and
reshaping the contours of privacy rights and remedies,”193 many tech
executives like Scott McNealy, who famously proclaimed that
“[people] have zero privacy” and that people should “get over it,”194
may urge for corporate leniency for the sake of innovation.195 In
other words, holding companies to a high security compliance standard would be costly and hinder innovation efforts. Therefore, lawmaking bodies should consider the harmful repercussions that could

191

Jeff Jonas, The Surveillance Society and Transparent You, in PRIVACY IN
MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 93, 98 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia
Horwitz, & Jeramie Scott eds., 2015).
192
Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and the Third-Party
Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 127.
193
LAW BUS. RESEARCH LTD, THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 288 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2014),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/files/publications/2014/11/the-privacy-dataprotection-and-cybersecurity-la__/files/united-states/fileattachment/unitedstates.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY].
194
Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’ WIRED, (Jan. 26, 1999),
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.
195
See Attitudes, supra note 177 (“[Y]ou will probably hear the claim that
some measures, if implemented, would prevent innovation[.]”).
THE
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follow from broadening privacy rights, which are integrated with the
United States’ economy and technological initiatives.196
Next, it may be unfair to fault companies that are unable to protect themselves against highly sophisticated hackers. Today’s
cyberattacks “are more stealthy and malicious than ever before . . . .
[and] are programmed to remain unnoticed for as long as possible . . . .”197 Hackers are no longer “attention-seeking geeks” but
instead “part of a highly specialized and distributed criminal ecology.”198 This new level of sophistication can reach any organization
from large technology companies (like Yahoo) to the Federal Reserve.199 The threat applies to small businesses as well (who often
make the mistake of thinking they will not be hacked).200 If the best
and most protected organizations are having trouble keeping up with
current “inevitable”201 breaches, then it is likely that small businesses and innovative startup companies may be even further behind.202 Assuming courts lower the standing threshold, these smaller
PRIVACY, supra note 193, at v (“[T]he frenetic conversion of the global
economy to an increasingly digital, internet-driven model is also stimulating a
rapid change in privacy, data protection and cybersecurity laws and regulations.”).
197
Data Breach Threat Analysis, SWORD & SHIELD, https://www.swordshield.com/security-assessments/data-breach-threat-analysis/ (last visited Feb.
13, 2018).
198
Lance Cottrell, Today’s Hackers Are Way More Sophisticated Than You
Think, READWRITE (Feb. 4, 2015) http://readwrite.com/2015/02/04/sophisticated-hackers-defense-in-depth/.
199
Cf. Robert E. Sumner, IV & Mindy L. Vervais, The Typical Data Breach
Lawsuit and How to Protect Your Company, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/10/01/the-typical-data-breach-lawsuit-andhow-to-protect (“It has been said that there are two types of companies: those that
have experienced a data breach and those that know they have experienced a data
breach.”).
200
Dennis Milewski, Survey Shows Small Businesses Have Big Data Breach
Exposure, MUNICH RE (Mar. 6, 2013). The Ponemon Institue found in a 2013
study that 55% of small businesses surveyed experienced a data breach. Id.
201
See Casler, supra note 173.
202
See Penny Crosman, New York Rewriting Cybersecurity Rules After
Banker Pushback, AM. BANKER (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/new-york-rewriting-cybersecurity-rules-after-bankerpushback. While larger companies may be able to adapt to new regulations, and
in turn new liabilities, smaller companies may have a harder time adjusting to the
requirements. As an example, consider a New York proposal to increase regulation thresholds on encryption for banks, to which many bank groups voiced concerns that, “[s]mall banks have much more limited resources than their larger bank
196
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entities “[would be] at a greater risk of going out of business because
of the litigation” costs,203 potentially hindering innovation.
Third, and related to the prior point, companies may need more
time to adapt their security methods to the heightening cybersecurity
threats. For example, at least as it pertains to healthcare companies
(42.5% of which were breached last year), technology is outdated
and there is a short supply of qualified professionals (e.g., security
engineers), making it difficult for companies to make quick changes
and to hire the adequate people.204 Similarly, “[t]raditional anti-virus/anti-malware vendors continue to lag behind online criminals”205 and “IT teams need more robust intelligence, protection,
and remediation to protect their data from breach or loss.”206 Lawmaking institutions have to understand what is actually possible.
These changes are not going to happen overnight, and Congress and
the judicial branch must be weary of making it too costly (through
increased compliance standards or easy consumer protection suits)
for companies to transition to adequate protection measures.207
Finally, one could argue that the status quo may be sufficient to
effectuate change because business and legal enforcement costs already push companies to improve security and compliance
measures. Even without successful consumer suits or new security
compliance regulations, data breaches already cost companies
enough money to incentivize them to take measures to avoid future
breaches.208 Each data breach costs companies an average of $5.85
brethren, therefore should not be made to meet all the same requirements . . . .”
Id.
203
See Casler, supra note 173.
204
See Tim Cannon, The Root of the Problem: How to Prevent Security
Breaches, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/02/the-root-of-the-security-problem/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). This article also offers investing in education (to account for qualified professional shortage) as a solution to data breach
problems, thereby implying that no short-term solution is available. Id.
205
Data Breach Threat Analysis, supra note 199.
206
Netskope, supra note 40.
207
See John Nadolenco & Evan M. Wooten, Lack of Standing in Data Privacy
Cases: Not Just A Federal Court Defense, MAYER BROWN (July 31, 2014),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/de/Lack-of-Standing-in-Data-Privacy-Cases?
(claiming that privacy cases have “particularly . . . high costs of discovery and
potential exposure”).
208
See John Stringer, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information: What
Data Is at Risk and What You Can do About It, SOPHOS 3 (Oct. 2011),
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million, according to the Ponemon Institute.209 Among this figure,
the average cost of defense of a data breach lawsuit comes out to
$574,984 and the average settlement to $258,099.210 International
scholars have admired the United States’ current privacy enforcement structure:
Taken together, this enforcement ecosystem has
proven to be nimble, flexible, and effective in adapting to rapidly changing technological developments
and practices, responding to evolving consumer and
citizen expectations, and serving as a meaningful
agent of deterrence and accountability. Indeed, the
US enforcement and litigation-based approach appears to be particularly well suited to deal with ‘recent inventions and business methods’– namely, new
technologies and modes of commerce – that pose
ever changing opportunities and unpredictable privacy challenges.211
Further, these same scholars have also stated that the United
States had “success of enforcement in pushing corporate privacy
managers . . . to develop state-of-the-art privacy practices . . . .”212
They attribute the proactive development of privacy policies and
standards to the “constant threat and unpredictability of future enforcement by the FTC and parallel state consumer protection officials, combined with the deterrent effect of enforcement actions
against peer companies . . . .”213 As a result of this dynamic, accepting this line of thinking would put a lesser burden on the judicial
branch to resolve its privacy standing circuit splits and on Congress
to legislate.

https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/other/sophosprotectingpii.pdf
(noting “the consequences [of data breaches] include [fines], reputation damage,
loss of customer trust, employee dissatisfaction and attrition, and clean-up costs
following the breach”).
209
See Sumner & Vervais, supra note 199.
210
Id. Other costs include $3,324,959 in lost business. Id.
211
PRIVACY, supra note 193, at 270.
212
Id. at 281.
213
Id. at 281–82.
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PRIVACY LAWS, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES: WHERE DO WE
GO FROM HERE?

“Concern about over-regulating in the private sector” has been
acknowledged as a reason why Congress has been slow to act, and
the judicial branch may be doing the same.214 Despite these concerns, something must be done. We have been in this situation before. In 1890, when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis defined privacy for the first time as the “right to be let alone,” they
recognized the “new right[]” because it needed to “grow[] to meet
the demands of society.”215 Just as the “[r]ecent inventions and business methods” called for changes then,216 the demands of society
today—the digitization of the persona and constant exchange, use,
and loss of PII—call for changes now.
Congress (mainly) and the Supreme Court have the power and
responsibility to define the limits of these new rights and of the redress available for these unique and unprecedented harms. They
must give clarity to consumers, companies, and everyone else affected by privacy issues—specifically in cases of data theft and data
misuse. In doing so, they must try to balance the interests of consumers (availability of redress in a situation where companies have
the most bargaining power and control of data) and companies
(needing adequate time to improve security and latitude to continue
driving innovation).217
Final Thoughts on Data Theft Situations and the Supreme
Court’s Role
Regarding data theft cases, Congress has not provided any
breach compliance and notification legislation, and, in the courts,
there is inconsistency over whether the risk of harm is enough for
Article III standing.218 However, because cybersecurity breaches are
214

Id. at 268–70.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193–95 (1890) (“For years there has been a feeling that the law must
afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
216
Id.
217
See supra Part V.
218
See supra Part III. As discussed earlier, because of the Supreme Court’s
unclear guidance to date, federal courts differ on whether the certainly impending
215
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technical, sophisticated, and difficult to understand without the
proper background,219 Congress may be more prepared to provide
guidance. It is likely that, because of the complexity of data privacy
rights, the Supreme Court is waiting on Congress to act, as it should
have by now. However, if given the opportunity, the Supreme Court
should, at the very least, clarify its analysis for determining data
theft harms as sufficient for standing.
To start, the Court should determine whether the certainly impending or substantial risk standard applies to data theft suits. The
substantial risk standard is a lower threshold of imminence than the
certainly impending standard.220 Remijas applied a substantial risk
standard and conferred standing. 221 The Seventh Circuit explained
that hackers steal information with a fraudulent intent of using it for
a crime, and this in itself is a sufficient substantial risk.222 Though
Remijas’ logic and holding may be deemed too tough on companies—especially because of the inevitable nature of data breaches—
by either supporting or denying this as the standard (as opposed to
the certainly impending standard), the Supreme Court will steer the
lower courts to apply and develop one standard. Having one standard will at least narrow the discussion and hopefully, help establish
a factual pattern that serves as precedent. That is, until Congress decides to legislate.
The Court could also provide guiding factors that take into account the policy implications of conferring standing (or not) in data
theft cases. Courts should at least consider what sort of information
was stolen and whether there is any presence of actual misuse of the
stolen data. In other words, it should matter factually what type of
information hackers steal. This Note does not explore the different
types of PII and the comparable risks of it being stolen, but it seems
logical that there should be a difference between one’s email address
standard or the substantial risk standard applies; whether the inherent fraudulent
intent of hackers is enough, or if something more is needed, to get a claim from
merely speculative to imminent; and consequently, whether to acknowledge postbreach mitigation costs as reasonable or as manufactured harm. In other words,
constitutional standing in privacy cases is a mess.
219
See supra Part II.
220
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).
221
See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 407.
222
See Remijas, 794 F. 3d at 693.
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being stolen versus one’s credit card information being stolen. In
general, it seems courts fear acknowledging harms (such as credit
monitoring services, credit card changes, etc.) as sufficient for
standing because of the risk that doing so would set precedent for
letting plaintiffs manufacture standing. Focusing on the type of information stolen would help filter and keep plaintiffs from manufacturing standing.
The more dangerous the type of information stolen, the more
reasonable for a consumer to respond, and therefore, the more reasonable for him or her to have access to the court system to seek
redress. For example, buying credit reporting services has been
acknowledged as an adequate response to stolen credit card numbers.223 If the threats arising from a stolen credit card are more imminent than with a stolen email address, then this should be a consideration that goes to the imminence of the harm. Additionally, this
would probably incentivize companies to categorize and minimize
the type and amount of data that they collect and keep, thereby reducing the risk for both consumers and companies.224
Also, the Court should take into account whether any other
plaintiff class members’ stolen PII has been misused.225 If the credit
cards or social security numbers of other class members have been
used without their authority, then that may serve as proof of imminent harm.226 This may have made a difference in Remijas, where
out of 350,000 exposed credit card numbers, 9,200 were known to
have been used fraudulently at the time of suit.227 Other possible
policy considerations, such as the timing of the breach and of subsequent notification to consumers could be considered as well. In
223
See id. at 694. (the victims [received] free credit monitoring and identity
theft protection, and “[t]hese credit-monitoring services come at a price that is
more than de minimis”).
224
See Bernard Marr, Why Data Minimization Is An Important Concept In The
Age of Big Data, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/16/why-data-minimization-is-an-important-concept-in-the-age-ofbig-data/#116cee76327f (“Data minimization also reduces cost. All data storage
costs money, and no business has an infinite budget — so no business can go on
collecting and storing data indefinitely.”).
225
See Torres v. Wendy’s Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(“For these courts, one influential factor is the number of plaintiffs in the class
action who experienced fraudulent charges.”).
226
Id.
227
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
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theory, this would be favorable to companies that notify users
quickly.
Considerations such as these will help develop a more consistent
jurisprudence that will hopefully lead to a better understanding of
when a consumer acts reasonably by incurring mitigation costs following a breach. With a more structured imminence analysis, courts
can more comfortably recognize the mitigation harms (and other
harms reasonably flowing from the breach) as merited. 228 In sum,
the Supreme Court should—as a temporary solution to Congress’
silence—address the circuit split resulting from Clapper and be
clearer about standards and factors that lower courts should use in
determining data theft standing.
Final Thoughts on Data Misuse Situations and the Supreme
Court’s Role
Regarding data misuse, while courts typically try to apply
Spokeo’s concreteness analysis (looking at the history and congressional judgment related to the alleged harm), they perform it in an
inconsistent manner that results in unpredictable outcomes.229 While
the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress could confer statutory rights, it also made contradicting statements that put lower
courts in a frenzy. Is a statutory violation procedural or substantive?
If procedural, is the violation sufficient for standing? It remains unclear.230
To make matters worse, the Court introduced a two-step test, the
historical and congressional judgment analysis, but it did not apply
it nor provide guidance to lower courts on its application. With regards to history, as mentioned above, some lower courts emphasize
the right to privacy as a traditional harm, while other courts do not
even mention the right to privacy at all.231 This all seems too abstract

See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th
Cir. 2016) (finding a concrete injury amounting to the time and expense incurred
to prevent and monitor fraudulent charges after plaintiffs’ data was breached);
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 688 (finding that “immediate preventative measures” were
“necessary” and conferring standing). But see Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d
38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that these harms were unwarranted).
229
See infra Part IV.
230
Id.
231
Id.
228
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and unnecessary. Instead, the analysis should focus on whether Congress has spoken, and if so, whether the Court should confer standing based on a statutory violation.
As a starting point, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife provides a clearer analysis for standing based
on statutory violations.232 As will be explained below, it is a lower
standard because, put simply, the Court “must be sensitive to the
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in
[the] common-law tradition.”233 While Congress and the Supreme
Court have acknowledged the right to privacy as a constitutional
right,234 it is unclear where the protection of personal data, such as
PII, fits within that constitutional sphere. And this is Congress’ job.
As Justice Kennedy wrote, “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before . . . .”235 The Court should
defer to Congress and acknowledge that privacy rights may be
broadening through the digitization of the persona, which should
give people certain rights over the protection and dissemination of
their PII. This would differentiate cases where Congress has spoken
(data misuse cases) from cases based purely on imminence of harm
(data theft cases), in which courts say that plaintiffs rely on a “highly
attenuated chain of possibilities.”236
These cases also differ from data theft cases in that, typically,
the only actor at fault is the company (instead of an unidentifiable
hacker). By failing to comply, companies that have the sole control
of PII put consumers in a vulnerable place. Such behavior, at least
where Congress has spoken, should be deterred. So, for data misuse
cases, the standard for conferring standing should not be very high.
These suits involve new and “complicated” types of harm and more

232

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
233
Id. at 580.
234
See generally 5 § U.S.C. 552(a) (2012) (delineating how agencies should
use personal records publicly and acknowledging the possible invasion of one’s
personal privacy)
235
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580.
236
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013).
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deference should be given to Congress’ consumer protection statutes.237
Specifically for data misuse cases, standing should be conferred
so long as Congress identifies the injury it seeks to vindicate and
relates the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.238 This
should be the “outer limit to [Congress’ power] to confer rights of
action” in data and consumer protection space.239 However, if Congress clearly confers a harm (pursuant to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan), such legislation should be taken seriously to protect
the people’s right to privacy.240
As an example, in the case of ensuring accurate reports, the
FCRA seems to both identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and to
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. 241 The
FCRA states that “a reporting agency . . . shall follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”242 So, it
is indicating the injury as the inaccuracy of the report. It also states
that any “person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement . . . is liable to that consumer . . . [for] any actual damages
sustained . . . or damages [between $100 and $1000].”243 It is specifically trying to protect the persons harmed by the inaccurate report. Therefore, by this standard, Congress has recognized the harm
Cf. Brief for EPIC, supra note 178, at 16–17 (“The need for statutory remedies is due, in part, to the complicated nature of harms resulting from privacy
violations.”); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 549 (2001) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the harms resulting from privacy invasions are
especially difficult to quantify and trace).
238
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239
Id.
240
Though not exactly the same because hackers are not companies, intentional trespass jurisprudence may serve as a potentially helpful analogy for defining the right to privacy. Some courts award at least nominal damages in intentional trespass cases (and sometimes even punitive damages) on grounds that people have a “constitutional right to the exclusive enjoyment” of their property.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997). Should we
view the right to control and protect consumer data, essentially a sort of digital
persona, as some courts view the right to exclusivity? Should we at least provide
minimal nominal or statutory damages when our digital persona is trespassed?
241
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012).
242
Id.
243
Id. § 1681n.
237
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and the class of persons, thereby demonstrating a “chain[] of causation” sufficient for standing.244
Similarly, the FDCPA seeks to “protect consumers against debt
collection abuses”245 by identifying consumers facing debt collectors as the injury class and by forbidding specific practices that are
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] with the collection
of any debt.”246 Therefore, “any debt collector who fails to comply . . . is liable to such person”247 because the debt collector has at
least statutorily injured a consumer.
As a final example, the TCPA makes it “unlawful for any person
within the United States” to initiate “any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without . . . prior express consent . . . .”248 It creates
a private right of action by those parties who are victims of the unlawful calls and establishes damages provisions to redress for the
intrusion itself or other monetary loss.249
The Lujan concurrence analysis fits well with the deference that
should be due to Congress and is beneficial to courts—it leaves the
procedural versus substantive right analysis to Congress because
Congress can clearly express when it creates a cause of action. As
for the public, it ensures that companies are at least abiding by the
minimum standard set forth by federal consumer protection statutes.
Also, assuming Congress decides to finally legislate on data theft
cases or to create other consumer protection statutes regarding the
integrity of PII, such statutes, coupled with this straightforward
analysis, will help parties better understand their rights.
CONCLUSION
With more people online, more information being exchanged,
and more companies getting hacked, the government needs to act to
protect PII.250 The ideal scenario would incentivize companies to
improve security measures and practices while not placing such a
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
Id. § 1692(e).
Id. § 1692(k).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 227(b)(3).
See supra Part I.
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burden that breach and litigation costs could bring businesses to fail
and stall innovation. While the issue would be best tackled by Congress, the Supreme Court may find itself in the driver’s seat once
again after its Clapper and Spokeo decisions resulted in circuit splits
and lower court confusion.251
The imminence and concreteness requirements for standing remain fuddled as “early dismissals [in privacy suits] have prevented
courts from defining what is reasonable.”252 If given the chance, the
Court should clarify the applicable imminence standard and provide
a set of considerations that could help lead to more predictable results and a more understandable threshold for data theft cases.253
Further, where Congress has spoken through consumer protection statutes, the Court should apply the Lujan concurrence analysis,
which rightfully defers to Congress the creation of privacy standing
because of the complicated nature of privacy harms. “While merely
complying [with statutes] may not be the best strategy for protecting
data from increasing attacks, it does ensure that, there is a minimum
standard to be met, at least decreasing the likelihood of a successful
breach.”254

251

See supra Parts III, IV.
Casler, supra note 173. Likely referring to reasonableness of consumers
taking mitigating precautions and becoming emotionally disturbed by the threat
of future harm. See supra Part V.
253
See supra Part V.
254
Lambert, supra note 15.
252

